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The Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965 (ESEA) was a watershed in fed-
eral education policy. Its primary provision—a 
block grant program under Title I—doubled 
federal revenues for K–12 education in autho-
rizing $1 billion ($7 billion in 2009 dollars) in 
new federal funding for supplemental academic 
programs for “educationally deprived” children 
from low-income families. Title I was most 
recently reauthorized under the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001 and remains the cornerstone 
of federal education policy today.
There is considerable debate over whether 
additional school spending can narrow gaps 
in achievement between poorer and richer stu-
dents. But the first-order challenge to a compen-
satory intergovernmental grants program like 
Title I is to ensure that it narrows gaps in school 
spending between higher-poverty and lower-
poverty school districts. In a standard neoclassi-
cal model, school districts would be expected to 
spend on education out of block grants as they 
would any other source of income (i.e., in accor-
dance with the income elasticity of education 
demand)—potentially much less than dollar-
for-grant-dollar. In response to a compensatory 
federal program like Title I, the state may also 
devote less tax revenue to education or distribute 
that aid less progressively.
While there have been numerous studies of 
the effects of Title I on student achievement,1 we 
1 Borman and D’Agostino (1996) present a metaanalysis 
of studies of the test score impacts of student participation 
in nominally designated Title I programs. Van der Klaauw 
(2008) and Matsudaira, Hosek, and Walsh (2012) estimate
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know little about how the introduction of Title 
I affected the poverty gap in school spending. 
Evidence on the spending impacts of Title I in 
its earliest years suggests a “flypaper effect”—
a spending response that exceeds what would 
have been expected on the basis of the income 
elasticity of education demand—and, hence, 
some spending convergence across richer and 
poorer school districts. But these studies are lim-
ited in one way or another, either exploiting only 
cross-sectional variation in Title I grant amounts 
(Feldstein 1978) or focusing on only part of the 
country (Cascio, Gordon, and Reber forthcom-
ing). Evidence on Title I using dynamic variation 
for the entire country (Gordon 2004) suggests 
complete crowd-out within three years—and, 
hence, no effect on the poverty gap in spending 
across school districts—but is based on a more 
recent (and more marginal) policy change than 
that stemming from program introduction.
This paper explores how the introduction of 
Title I may have affected school spending gaps 
across richer and poorer states using state panel 
data for the entire country. Federal policy is 
uniquely suited to addressing regional inequali-
ties, and, indeed, given the uneven regional dis-
tributions of poverty and school spending in the 
United States, promotion of regional spending 
convergence was a goal of this “War on Poverty” 
program. Our newly collected data suggest that 
Title I may have narrowed the gap in school 
spending between richer and poorer states but 
was far too small a program to eliminate this gap 
entirely.
the effects of Title I designation at the school, rather than the 
student, level. Despite differences in empirical technique, 
the studies are united in suggesting little achievement impact 
of Title I. 
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I. The Title I Program
The ESEA was far reaching, but its most 
significant provision by far was Title I. Title I 
funds were initially distributed primarily based 
on counts of poor children from the 1960 cen-
sus, and grants per eligible child were smaller 
in states that spent less on average.2 Given that 
higher-poverty states were, on average, lower-
spending, this feature of the formula reduced 
the program’s progressivity relative to what it 
would have been with a single, national grant 
per eligible child. Nevertheless, per-pupil Title I 
formula amounts in the late 1960s were strongly 
increasing in 1960 state child poverty rates, and 
a linear poverty term alone can explain most of 
the cross-state variation in per-pupil Title I for-
mula amounts.
The size of the program, combined with 
this feature of the funding formula, made the 
distribution of overall federal education aid 
compensatory. Figure 1 shows that between 
the 1963–1964 school year (hollow markers) 
and the 1969–1970 school year (solid mark-
ers)—before and after the introduction of Title 
I—overall per-pupil federal revenue went from 
being uncorrelated with the 1960 child poverty 
rate to having a strong positive correlation with 
it. The increase in slope is more than would be 
expected on the basis of Title I, though not sig-
nificantly so.
While the intended use of Title I funds is for 
supplemental academic programs for “educa-
tionally deprived” children from low-income 
families, Title I funds have often been used in 
other ways. For example, audits from the pro-
gram’s earliest years (Martin and McClure 
1969) show that some school districts used 
Title I funds to make capital investments. Other 
school districts substituted Title I grants for state 
and local funds, either by moving state and local 
revenues away from the poorer schools that 
received the Title I grants, or by lowering taxes, 
in which case the grants were not even spent on 
education. Regulations in the early 1970s sought 
to improve targeting and to prevent crowd-out, 
but expropriation remains difficult to prevent.
2 See Cascio et al. (2010) and Cascio, Gordon, and Reber 
(forthcoming) for more details on the Title I formula and 
implementation in the 1960s. 
II. Title I and the State Poverty Gap 
in School Spending
Available data do not allow us to observe 
school spending on poor children per se. Our 
goal is therefore to understand how the intro-
duction of Title I might have affected the gap 
in overall school spending across richer and 
poorer states.3 To this end, we obtained state-
by-school-year–level data on current spend-
ing per pupil in average daily attendance for 
all states in the continental United States from 
1953–1954 to 2007–2008.4 These data show 
that real per-pupil school spending increased by 
3 We use the 1960 child poverty rate implicit in the initial 
Title I formula, but our conclusions are substantively similar 
if we use the overall poverty rate or measure poverty (child 
or overall) in later years. 
4 Fall Statistics of Public Schools (US Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), various years) 
provided data on a biennial basis from 1953–1954 through 
1979–1980. Thereafter, we drew data from all available 
academic years from the Digest of Education Statistics (US 
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Slope est. = $1,213 ($177)
R2 = 0.5
1963-1964:
Slope est. = $45 ($112)
R2 = 0.003
Figure 1. The Relationship between Child Poverty 
and Per-Pupil Federal Revenue before and after the 
Introduction of Title I
Notes: Per-pupil federal revenue is expressed in real 2009 
dollars and is drawn from HEW (various years). The 1960 
child poverty rate is the number of Title I eligible children 
in the state in 1965 (from US Office of Education 1965) to 
the number of 5–17-year-olds in the state in 1960 (from 
Minnesota Population Center 2011). Hollow markers rep-
resent 1963–1964, and solid markers represent 1969–1970. 
Square markers represent Southern states, and circle mark-
ers represent all other states in the continental United States. 
Regressions give each state equal weight.
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over a  factor of five over the period, from about 
$2,000 per pupil in 1953–1954 to over $11,000 
in 2007–2008 (2009 dollars).5 Given this, we 
analyze per-pupil spending in percent terms, 
using its natural log, rather than in dollar terms.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the 
1960 child poverty rate and log per-pupil spend-
ing right before and well after Title I was imple-
mented. In 1963–1964 (hollow markers), there 
was considerable variation in spending across 
states, and this variation was strongly related to 
poverty. In 2006–2007 (solid markers), by con-
trast, the variation in log spending was virtually 
unchanged from its pre-ESEA level,6 but the 
analogous regression yields a slope that is half 
as steep as it was in 1963–1964, with an R2 of 
only 0.17.7
5 Our analysis gives each state equal weight, though our 
findings are similar if we weight by enrollment or school-
aged population. 
6 In 1963–1964, the standard deviation of log per-pupil 
spending was 0.226; in 2006–2007, it was 0.217. 
7 The figure also shows that while Southern states 
(which we define as those in the former Confederacy) were 
Was the poverty gap in school spending 
diminished by the introduction of Title I, or 
were there other forces at work? While we can-
not rule out the importance of other factors, 
we provide some evidence of a contribution of 
Title I to these changes in Figure 3, which plots 
slope coefficients analogous to those shown 
in Figure 2, but on a year-by-year basis from 
1953–1954 to 2007–2008. There is a clear break 
in trend in 1965–1966, when Title I funds were 
first distributed. Taking the pre-1965 trend in 
the poverty gradient as the counterfactual, one 
would conclude that Title I reduced the poverty 
gradient in spending for a decade or so: after 
a sharp decline in 1965–1966, the poverty gap 
remained roughly constant in the two decades 
following the introduction of Title I and began to 
decline steadily again around 1990–1991.
While Title I thus appears to have stimulated 
some convergence in school spending across 
states, it would have needed to be a much larger 
program to eliminate spending differences 
across richer and poorer states. We calculate 
 significantly lower spending on average, their lower spend-
ing was in line with their significantly higher poverty rates. 
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Slope est. = –1.09 (0.35)
R2 = 0.17
1963–1964 (left scale):
Slope est. = –2.28 (0.22)
R2 = 0.695
Figure 2. The Relationship between Child Poverty and 
Per-Pupil School Spending in 1963–1964 and 2006–2007
Notes: Per-pupil school spending is expressed in real 
2009 dollars and is drawn from HEW (various years) and 
Department of Education (various years). See Figure 1 note 
for description of the 1960 child poverty rate. Hollow mark-
ers represent 1963–1964, and solid markers represent 2006–
2007. Square markers represent Southern states, and circle 
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Figure 3. How the Relationship between Child 
Poverty and Per-Pupil School Spending Changed over 
Time
Notes: The figure plots slope coefficients from year-by-
year regressions of log per-pupil school spending on the 
1960 child poverty rate. Regressions give each state equal 
weight. The dashed vertical line is placed at 1965, the year 
that Title I was introduced. For sources, see Figure 2 note.
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that if there were no state or local crowd-out and 
nothing else changed, the introduction of Title I 
would have reduced the cross-state poverty gra-
dient in spending by only about 15 percent.8
As mentioned above, Title I’s introduction 
also appears not to have had much of an effect 
on the variation in school spending across 
states. A considerable share of this more recent 
variation also appears to owe to per capita state 
income, not poverty. Figure 4 plots the R2 from 
year-by-year regressions of log per-pupil school 
spending on the 1960 child poverty rate (solid 
circles), on real per capita state income (hollow 
circles), and on both (the x’s). Before the ESEA, 
income was slightly more predictive of spend-
ing than poverty, but only marginally so. There 
is a clear downward shift in 1965–1966, and the 
predictive power of both poverty and income 
declined continuously through the mid-1980s. 
The predictive power of poverty and income 
then diverged: the R2 for poverty continued to 
decline, while that for income rose sharply, 
8 In level terms, a 10 percentage point increase in the 
1960 child poverty rate was associated with a reduction in 
spending of $625 per pupil in 1963–1964 (based on a ver-
sion of Figure 2 with per-pupil spending in levels), but only 
a $91 increase in per-pupil Title I funding in 1969. 
peaking at over 0.6 in 1988. While its predictive 
power declined thereafter, per capita income has 
continued to explain more variation in spending 
in recent years. The predictive power of income 
controlling for poverty points to a potential role 
for income inequality in determining school 
spending during the period when many states 
reformed their school finance systems.9
III. Conclusion
School spending has long been negatively 
correlated with poverty at the state level, but this 
relationship has weakened in the 50 years since 
passage of the ESEA. We have presented evi-
dence that the introduction of Title I contributed 
to this trend. Nevertheless, Title I was a small 
program relative to the spending differences 
associated with poverty, and substantial poverty 
gaps in spending remain. This is one potential 
reason why Title I has appeared so ineffective 
in closing the achievement gap. We neverthe-
less view these and any other conclusions as 
tentative given the limitations of our data and 
methodology.
Is Title I therefore failed policy? Not neces-
sarily. The ability to withhold education funds 
is a key policy lever for the federal govern-
ment to encourage school districts to imple-
ment other reforms. At Title I’s inception, for 
example, receipt of funds in the South was 
conditional on meeting desegregation targets 
under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. These finan-
cial incentives worked, marking the beginning 
of the end of racially separate schools in the 
South (Cascio et al. 2010)—a process which 
culminated in notable gains in black educational 
attainment (Guryan 2004; Reber 2010; Johnson 
2011). More recently, under the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001, receipt of Title I funds has 
been tied to adoption of state school account-
ability systems—a policy which appears to 
have reduced achievement gaps (Dee and Jacob 
2011). Whether and how federal money might 
buy progress in the future remains to be seen.
9 See Boustan et al. (forthcoming) and Corcoran and 
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Both
Figure 4. Did Title I Reduce the Power of Poverty 
and Income in Explaining Cross-State Spending 
Inequality?
Notes: The figure plots R2 from year-by-year regressions of 
log per-pupil school spending on the 1960 child poverty rate 
(solid circles), current per capita income (hollow circles), 
and both variables together (x’s). Regressions give each state 
equal weight. The dashed vertical line is placed at 1965, the 
year that Title I was introduced. For sources, see note for 
Figure 2.
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